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"U.S.-China Relations in Post-September 11^th World?"

A Monograph Release and Panel Discussion with Kenneth Lieberthal, David M. Lampton, and Richard Daniel Ewing

September 18, 2002
The Nixon Center, Washington, DC

At a recent luncheon at the Nixon Center, the China Studies Program released its most recent policy study, U.S.-China Relations in a Post- September 11^th World, authored by David M. Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing. Mr. Ewing began the program by providing a concise summary of the report’s contents and conclusions. Additionally, Kenneth Lieberthal and Dr. Lampton discussed U.S.-China relations, China’s internal situation, and the coming leadership change in China in the context of that report. Richard Daniel Ewing was formerly Assistant Director of the China Studies Program at The Nixon Center and currently is at the Wharton School of Business in Philadelphia. Dr. Lieberthal is currently Professor of Political Science and Business at the University of Michigan and was formerly at the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration. Dr. Lampton is the Director of The Nixon Center’s Chinese Studies Program and Director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins-SAIS.

Ewing gave a brief overview of some of the highlights from U.S.-China Relations in a Post- September 11^th World. The monograph focused on U.S.-China relations from January 2001 to mid-summer 2002, basically the first 19 months of the administration of President George W. Bush, the buildup to the coming leadership transition in China, the principal issues driving the relationship, and the report offered some policy suggestions.

The report’s first chapter focused on the Bush Administration and what sort of priorities the Bush Team had come into office with. The study identified two competing sets of priorities of the Bush Administration. On the one hand, the senior members of the Bush security team view China as a rising power that could potentially threaten U.S. interests over the longer term. These members of the Administration advocate strengthening U.S. military alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region, building a more capable and flexible military presence in the area, and deterring any military actions by China across the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the more business-oriented wing of the Republican Party advocates stronger economic engagement with the PRC. These advisors focus on China’s status as the world’s fastest growing economy and hope that over the long run economic reforms and progress in China will give rise to political change.

The second chapter focuses on the Chinese leadership’s initial reactions to the Bush Administration, its attempts at dialogue with Washington, and the inherent frictions within the Chinese system that inhibit a fully effective policy with respect to the United States. Currently, the Chinese are focused on China’s domestic economic, social, and political difficulties, generational leadership change, and social unrest. Moreover, China sees the U.S. as its most important bilateral partner, an important source of foreign direct investment, a large export market, and as the world’s only remaining superpower.

Chapter Three lays out the four principal issues driving U.S.-China relations. One, The War on Terror and Chinese cooperation has provided a sounder footing for the relationship. Two, non-proliferation has risen to great importance for the Administration and Chinese reluctance to be fully responsive to American concerns has resulted in tension over this issue, though the Chinese recently have shown an inclination to be more cooperative in this regard. Three, the Bush Administration has made some moves towards closer relations with Taiwan that have troubled China. Four, domestic stability is at the forefront of Chinese concerns, especially in terms of increased social unrest and the coming leadership change.

Finally Ewing laid out some of the policy recommendations in the report. The U.S. should work to encourage social and economic ties across the Strait to diffuse tension, and work to engage China’s incoming leaders at all levels. China should reduce its missile buildup on the coast facing Taiwan because it contributes to tension in the Taiwan Strait and Beijing should make further efforts to demonstrate that proliferation is high on its agenda. Taiwan should refrain from provocative actions and recognize that the Administration has red lines that it wants Taipei to observe. Also, China and the U.S. should work to re-energize military-to-military exchanges that have been basically frozen since immediately after the EP-3 incident of April 2001.

Dr. Lieberthal began by commenting that U.S.-China Relations in a Post- September 11^th World is "wide-ranging, balanced and there is nothing that I disagree with." Then he went on to make comments on some of the topics raised by the report based on his own knowledge and on the month he spent in Beijing this summer.

Lieberthal argued that China is determined to have stable and cooperative relations with the United States and this grows out of two driving forces: One, China recognizes that its enormous and sobering domestic challenges are paramount and that the last thing the Chinese leaders need is international tensions, especially with the United States. These challenges include: large-scale and permanent rural to urban migration, close to 100% bankruptcy in local governments, devastating environmental concerns, enormous financial problems, the uncertain leadership succession, and the difficulties of meeting its WTO accession agreements.

The second driver, the context of the post-September 11^th world, has greatly changed reactions to U.S. foreign policy. After the end of the Cold War, China hoped that a multi-polar world would emerge--September 11^th ended those hopes. Vladimir Putin’s decision to embrace the U.S. after September 11^th startled the Chinese, especially the lack of response to Bush abandoning the ABM Treaty. China could not stand alone on the issue and also could not afford to anger the Russians in light of the fact that China is dependent on Russia for a large amount of modern armaments.

Lieberthal cautioned that there are three caveats to China’s efforts to maintain good U.S.-China relations: One, Taiwan is at the top of Beijing’s foreign (or it could be said, domestic) agenda. The Pentagon’s recent moves to enhance military-to-military ties with Taipei alarm China and thereby contribute to unnecessary tension. Two, counter-terrorism for now justifies U.S. military action and moves, but it does create apprehensions in Beijing. Currently, China is seemingly encircled by U.S. forces and allies, however all of this is done in the name of fighting terrorism. China cannot object and its only option is to help the counter-terrorism struggle. Three, U.S. policies assume a rising China. What if China can’t overcome its problems? We have not given sufficient thought to what a "failing China" might mean for American interests.

Dr. Lampton also conducted a series of interviews this summer in China. He interviewed 21 people, over eight days, in both Shanghai and Beijing, ranging from a top military officer, through ambassadors, to professors. From his interviews, Dr. Lampton came away with four conclusions:

Dr. Lampton was somewhat surprised to find the degree to which the mainstream view in China is that the current strategic situation is conducive to U.S-China cooperation. Before September 11^th, China had been the main focus of hawks in the Bush Administration. Afterwards, in the view of most Chinese Lampton interviewed, the focus shifted to counter-terrorism and the Middle East and Central Asia. It is unlikely that U.S. attention will focus again on China in the near term-future in the way it had immediately before September 11^th. According to one of Lampton’s interviewees, "The American plate is already full enough without China on it as a strategic problem." The American preoccupation with problems elsewhere gives China some breathing room to deal with its own internal problems. Additionally, the Taiwan situation has become more relaxed on several counts: China and Taiwan are becoming ever more economically integrated, recent U.S. reactions to Taiwanese "provocation" have been in China’s interest, Chen Shui-bian is in a relatively weak position domestically, the Taiwanese economy is performing poorly, and Taiwan has been unable or unwilling to increase its defense spending.

Dr. Lampton’s second observation was that the Chinese were willing to explore changing their policies on certain issues if and when other people changed their policies. For example, for the first time in Lampton’s experience, in an interview with a significant Chinese spokesperson, the idea of a Chinese missile cap was brought up and discussed. In another interview, for the first time, an interviewee suggested, "We could never say that we won’t use force. We can’t say that. But we might be able to say we would never use force for reunification if the U.S. was willing to do certain things." Lampton made clear these were just given as examples, not formal, or even informal, proposals.

The third observation dealt with Iraq. Dr. Lampton argued that China would not stand alone on this issue. During the course of Dr. Lampton’s interviews, when asking how China will stand on the use of force against Iraq, in the UN Security Council and elsewhere, the answers he heard consistently used phrases such as, "In practice, there is very little we can or want to do about the situation." "China will not support the use of force against Iraq" "We do not favor the use of force against Iraq." Absent from the answers were, "We will oppose it." The most interesting response was, "We will express regret at the situation and we’ll belong to the majority."

The last observation has to do with the leadership transition. Unfortunately no one was very forthcoming with Dr. Lampton on this subject but he came away with four main impressions: First, the transition from the third generation to the fourth generation will be less significant that the shift from the fourth generation (who mainly came of age during the Cultural Revolution and was greatly shaped by that era) to the fifth generation which was generally trained in the period of openness and reform and many of whom have substantial experience abroad. Second, irrespective of who China’s next leaders may be, the policies will not change significantly. Third, the transition from the third generation to the fourth has already occurred at the local government and Party levels. Finally, the forecast for the top leadership is still the same as it was in May, when Hu Jintao visited the U.S.

This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center staff member Kelani C. Chan.