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“Evolving U.S.-China Military Ties with China and Taiwan.”

A discussion with the Honorable Kurt Campbell 

January 30, 2003

The Nixon Center, Washington DC 

At a recent breakfast briefing at The Nixon Center, Dr. Kurt Campbell, director of the International Security Program and vice-president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), assessed the state of US-China military relations and cross-Taiwan Strait ties. Before joining CSIS, Dr. Campbell served in several government capacities, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific, as a member of the National Security Council Staff, and as a White House fellow at the Department of Treasury. Campbell was previously an associate professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and an officer in the U.S. Navy, where he served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Dr. David M. Lampton, Director of China Studies at The Nixon Center, moderated the discussion. 

US-China Military-to-Military Ties

Dr. Campbell began by recalling that within the last four months, during four separate trips to China, the remarks of his Chinese counterparts reflected the warming of US-China relations.  In November, Dr. Campbell had been told that US-China relations were the best in ten years; in January, Chinese officials said to him that this was the best period of Sino-US cooperation since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.   

Dr. Campbell attributed this change to 9/11, which he said created a strategic environment that requires the US to cooperate with China to combat terrorism. Despite the absence of military ties in the past three years, these links have resumed in the past two months and have further developed intelligence cooperation, information sharing and personal contacts.  

There has also been, according to Dr. Campbell, recognition by the Bush Administration that China can play a significant role in maintaining a stable Asian security structure. This is especially true regarding its neighbors and allies such as Pakistan and North Korea. 

Dr. Campbell explained that interpersonal ties, especially those within the business community, are the ballast that holds the bilateral relationship steady. In the past, after disruptive incidents such as the Chinese fighter jet’s collision with an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft, it was the US business community among others who kept US-China relations on track. Presently, the Chinese leadership is focused on domestic issues and sees a preoccupied US and strong trade and industry ties as a good thing for both the Chinese economy and a stable bilateral relationship.  

Dr. Campbell then argued that when the US looks back decades from now it would see that the last two years and the present represent the most dramatic strategic change in Asia’s recent history. Chinese political, economic, and military concerns have begun to dominate agendas and decisions in Asia. How to deal with China’s growing power has become the top priority of countries throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia.  

Dr. Campbell contends that compared to Japanese and American diplomacy in the 1990s, China’s foreign policy has grown more mature and sophisticated along with its influence. For example, on the issue of North Korea, the US turned to China for help because it failed to achieve its objectives. In response, China offered to host a meeting between the United States and North Korea rather than participate in the meeting themselves; a clever diplomatic sidestep. 

Many in the White House, particularly Vice-President Cheney, have come to realize China’s importance in achieving US policy objectives. Due to this new support high level military contacts have resumed and many American military officers are being told to take the advantage of this unique historical moment of cooperation. Dr. Campbell suggested that leaders on both sides look to formalize initiatives in an effort to preserve the gains achieved. 

Yet, Dr. Campbell explained that reluctance in the Pentagon to closer military ties with China is due to concerns over reciprocity, openness, secrecy and espionage. This is in contrast to the late 1990s when US military officers were strongly interested in military interaction with China. Today, US officials fear being accused of secretive contact with their counterparts. 

Interestingly, previously the US was pressing hard and China was only luke warm about extending military-to-military ties. Yet, in recent months it has been the Chinese military that has been remarkably more open, even developing their own concrete suggestions and initiatives. 

The Chinese, Dr Campbell asserted, generally use Western educated English speaking “interactees,” to help interpret both language and culture for military officers.  In general, the “interactees” tend to be younger and better educated then their military collogues. The “real” military are frequently concerned about the Taiwan question and the status of their American counterparts.  Chinese military officers often use the level of their American counterparts to determine their own status. In China today, Campbell believes that the military’s role in decision making and political power has substantially diminished or was overestimated in early 2000.

Taiwan

Regarding Taiwan, Dr. Campbell interprets the Bush administration’s policy as a clear change from so-called “strategic ambiguity,” to a new policy of “dual clarity.”  He explained that President Bush’s current policy is one of  “no military coercion, no independence.” Any Chinese military action against Taiwan will clearly encounter US force.  The administration will continue to change Taiwan policy in subtle ways silently and behind the scenes.

Dr. Campbell made clear that China sees US opposition to Taiwanese independence as a major achievement in its foreign policy. Yet, the Taiwanese, while appreciative of US military support, see economic development as their primary objective.  They have shown little real enthusiasm for the new clarified policy because the broad population does not actually believe a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is possible and they have taken US military support for granted for years.  

Beginning during the Clinton presidency and continuing through the Bush Administration there has been a substantial increase in unofficial military and business contact between the US and Taiwan, Dr. Campbell remarked. Yet, while contacts are increasing, there remains no high level interaction, and for the most part the isolation of Taiwan for the last 20 or 25 years still exists.  

Dr. Campbell presented the primary concerns that Taiwanese military officials are facing: 1) China’s growing militarization of the Taiwan Strait, 2) the process of civilianization of the military, 3) a stagnating defense budget, 4) the ongoing removal of the KMT from the military 5) previously unheard of legislative inquires into military affairs 6) most Taiwanese people discount the prospect of military action and instead focus on economic issues or their own problems. Dr. Campbell then pointed out that strong and clear US support of Taiwan leads Taiwanese to feel that the US will guarantee their security and their own military expenditure is wasteful.  

Dr. Campbell maintains that the largest stumbling point in the interrelations of the US, China and Taiwan remains the militarization of the Taiwan Strait. America and China will have to institutionalize today’s good relations in order to combat the instability that will result if missiles continue to be deployed along the Strait. 

Dr. Campbell concluded by offering a wait and see approach, claiming that in five to ten years the US and China will have to face the results of military build up along the Taiwan Strait. Thus, the primary question is whether or not the good relations of today will translate into understanding tomorrow.

 

This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center China Studies Assistant Director Joshua Eisenman.

 

 


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