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"Afghanistan and Pakistan: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?"
A Panel Discussion

Speakers during a recent Nixon Center panel discussion suggested that the wisdom and timing of a U.S. led war to oust Saddam Hussein must surely be influenced by the progress, or lack of it, made in defeating terrorist cells and establishing governments in Afghanistan. Panelists included: Marin Strmecki, Senior Vice President at the Smith Richardson Foundation and a Nixon Center Advisory Council member; Anatol Lieven, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Paula Newberg, Special Adviser to the UN Foundation and the Center for International Cooperation at NYU. Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, moderated the discussion.

"There is a crisis of legitimacy in the Afghan government because it is too narrowly based and dominated by one small group within Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance," warned Marin Strmecki. Following the military successes of the United States and the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance in routing Al Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan, the rebuilding process has been met by an ethnic tribal power struggle, he said.

Strmecki asserted that the current imbalance in the Afghan government is a result of the negotiations that took place during the Loya Jirga, an assembly of tribal and ethnic leaders that met in Kabul in June to select the transitional government that would lead Afghanistan for the next two years. Seeing the near 80% support for Zahir Shah, the former King of Afghanistan and an ethnic Pashtun, among the Loya Jirga delegates, Northern Alliance leaders feared that their power could be endangered, Strmecki asserted. "The Northern Alliance threatened to walk out of the conference and the United States felt it was in the best interest of stability to sideline the former King so Washington pressed the King to withdraw his candidacy," he explained.

Still, according to Paula Newberg Interim President Hamid Karzai also has limited support. "Karzai does not have support in the west of the country," she said. Moreover, as Strmecki noted, the majority of the ministerial positions, including key posts such as Defense Minister, head of the Security Intelligence Service, and Foreign Minister, went to the Northern Alliance. Anatol Lieven suggested that this disparity creates a danger of the return of chaos to Afghanistan. "This imbalance is not sustainable in the long run," he argued, and it could easily lead to renewed chaos – and renewed opportunities for al Qaeda.

Paula Newberg emphasized that the nature of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s relationship makes them very sensitive to one another’s domestic problems. In fact, she argued that "Afghan security is necessary for Pakistani peace and vice versa." A major concern for the panelists was that the instability in Kabul could spill over to Pakistan and create major problems for the current Pakistani leadership. Strmecki argued that such instability could shift the domestic balance of power against General Pervez Musharraf, who aligned himself with the United States following September 11th, and in favor of the Wahabbi fundamentalists in Pakistan, including radical elements within the government’s own Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that previously had supported the Taliban regime. charged that the ISI continues its support for Taliban and Al Qaeda elements: "We see a great number of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders migrating across the border into Pakistan and there they are protected by elements of the ISI."

Lieven advised against seeking to minimize the roles of other external players, such as Russia and Iran, in the country’s rebuilding process. "The fact is that influence, as such, is not the problem and that in the days of the Taliban, Russia and Iran played an absolutely critical role in supporting the anti-Taliban forces when, in turn, the United States was doing nothing." Lieven explained that without this support from Russia and Iran, the Northern Alliance might have ceased to exist and the United States could have faced a much stronger Al Qaeda and Taliban military force. Lieven also cited a cultural link between Afghanistan’s neighbors that is far more influential than the United States. "In many ways, parts of Afghanistan are economically more like Pakistan and Iran than Afghanistan itself." Because the level of external influence is so great in Afghanistan, Lieven argued that these countries must be included in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. "We have to achieve a greater balance in Kabul, but need to face the fact that this is going to be very difficult and that it involves difficult negotiations . . .not just with Afghan ethnic and political groups, but also with the Russians and Iranians."

The panelists vigorously debated the efficacy and prospects of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the UN Security Council sanctioned peacekeeping force in Afghanistan slated to exit in 2004. Newberg asserted that the ISAF "must go beyond Kabul. In fact it must start outside of Kabul and move its way toward Kabul." In her view, Kabul cannot be stabilized so long as regional conflicts continue across Afghanistan. However, Lieven suggested that the current ISAF force would be overextended if it were sent to other areas within Afghanistan. "I am in favor of ISAF moving out to the rest of the country, but who provides the troops? Right now it could move to perhaps one other area. To me it is much more important to extend ISAF in time rather than territory."

Though Strmecki argued that ISAF could successfully complete its peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan within five years, Lieven emphasized that the process will take much longer. He argued that "Afghanistan could well be described at present as somewhat living in the 10^th century. If we can get Afghanistan from the 10^th century to the 12^th century we will have already considerably accelerated history." Nevertheless, Lieven said that the United States and others that have suffered casualties in the war on terrorism and must be prepared to take casualties in the rebuilding phase as well and remain for the long haul. "We start by thinking in decades not in years, and certainly not in withdrawing ISAF in 2004," he said. If the ISAF is withdrawn in 2004, which is still the plan, it must be apparent by now that the cup will not be half empty or half full but broken in a matter of weeks."
This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center Staff Member Gregory Fedor.