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Program Brief, vol. 7, #22
(c) The Nixon Center 2001

"September 11 and U.S.-China Ties: A Chance for a New Strategic Partnership?"
A Nixon Center seminar featuring Richard Solomon

The Nixon Center, Washington, DC
December 12, 2001

At a recent luncheon at The Nixon Center, the Honorable Richard Solomon, President of the United States Institute of Peace and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, argued that the events of September 11 and their aftermath have presented an opportunity that the U.S. and China can use to improve their relationship. In his view, these opportunities include cooperation on constructive relations with Islamic countries, counter-terrorism, international drug trafficking, and weapons non-proliferation initiatives. However, Solomon also cautioned that contentious issues still remain to be managed in the relationship: missile defense, the Quadrennial Defense Review realignment toward Asia, and Taiwan. David M. Lampton, Director of Chinese Studies at The Nixon Center, moderated the discussion.

Solomon began his remarks by offering a realist assessment of September 11’s impact on international relations and America’s position in the world. Unlike the Cold War, America has no major strategic adversaries and does not need to block the expansion of Moscow and Beijing’s influence. In this new period, America has better relations with Russia and India and even has troops in the former Soviet Union. These geopolitical changes mean that new thinking on global issues and threats can emerge. The current situation could allow the major powers to forge a coalition for the first time since the end of the Cold War. In addition, the U.S. and China may be able to use the new situation to improve their relationship.

Although this new era may offer a foundation for cooperation, from a balance of power perspective China feels strategically encircled. From Beijing’s point of view, China faces new strategic challenges on all of its borders. America’s military is fighting in Afghanistan and Washington has forged closer relations with China’s neighbors, including Pakistan, India, and Russia. The Japanese have become more active in global security and peacekeeping efforts, while America’s presence in the Central Asia cuts across China’s attempts to build closer ties with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan).

To better understand this potential shift in relations, Solomon examined several inflection points in modern U.S.-China relations. In the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution convulsed China while America was mired in the Indochina conflict. Relations between the U.S. and China seemed in a permanent "deep freeze." But in 1971 there was a dramatic "flip" when the Nixon Administration opened a relationship with China based on the common Soviet threat.

Although the 1970s and 1980s seemed a halcyon era in U.S.-China relations, tensions nevertheless developed quickly. The strategic triangle (the U.S., China, and the USSR) was constantly in play. Considering China the most exposed player, Mao felt used by the Americans and he accused Washington of trying to "stand on China’s shoulders" to get at the Soviets. Skeptical of the U.S. effort at détente with the Soviets, Beijing tried to highlight the Soviet threat to America.

U.S.-China relations entered a "Golden Age" in the 1980s. Both nations continued to feel threatened by the Soviet Union (what Deng termed the "polar bear") and a new spirit of cooperation marked relations. The dialogue showed considerable openness between the two nations, evidenced by Beijing’s willingness to share with Washington its frustrations with North Korea. This was also a period of Sino-American cooperation in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.

The second "flip" in U.S.-China relations came in 1989 with the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square. Solomon noted that, "In one day the violence at Tiananmen destroyed the political foundations of normal relations with China." Despite Deng Xiaoping and President George Bush’s willingness to preserve the relationship, the traumatic events caused a public rift. Americans were apprehensive about how China might use its growing strength, while Beijing became concerned with America’s unchecked power, particularly after the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Lacking the USSR as a focal point, the next period of U.S.-China relations was marked by "strategic ambiguity." America pursued a wide range of issues with China during the early 1990s, including human rights, Tibet, trade problems, proliferation, and growing tension over Taiwan. China’s 1996 missile diplomacy and the deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait raised tensions to alarming levels. Realizing that they shared the risk of drifting into military confrontation, the Clinton Administration and China’s leaders made a concerted effort to repair the relationship. Out of Clinton and Jiang’s summit dialogue in 1997 came talk of a future U.S.-China "strategic partnership." However, despite the intention to improve relations, leaders in both capitals knew instinctively that this was just an "empty cannon"-a nice sounding phrase without real content.

During the 2000 American Presidential election, Republicans rejected Clinton’s characterization of China as a "strategic partner" and dubbed China a "strategic competitor." Tension and skepticism toward China marked George W. Bush’s first seven months in office, especially during the EP-3 incident on Hainan Island. Then came September 11.

Addressing the question of a possible paradigm shift in bilateral relations, Solomon noted that traditional concerns still exist. Taiwan, human rights, and weapons proliferation concerns still occupy U.S. thinking, but there may be a new context for more effective management of the relationship. The Chinese have tried to be responsive, but it is unclear whether there will be a basis for a new strategic partnership. However, Solomon argued that there are opportunities to build a new relationship. Unlike the first two decades of U.S.-China relations, the present relationship would not be principally based on a common enemy. Instead, Solomon asserted that there is a new "positive agenda" for U.S.-China cooperation.

The first area of potential cooperation is with relations toward the Islamic world. Focusing narrowly on terrorism masks the real significance of the September 11 attacks: turmoil in the Islamic world. One source of instability is Osama bin Laden’s intention to destabilize Islamic countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt), and another is the division within the Islamic world between secular modernizing Islam and conservative Islam.

These tensions in the Islamic world are important because China has Muslim minorities and has sought influence in the Islamic world. China’s energy and security needs have prompted it to extend relations into the Middle East and Central Asia.

The second area of cooperation is on counter-terrorism. Officials hypothesized that conflict in the early 21^st century would be marked by weapons proliferation, terrorism, and asymmetric warfare. September 11 made these conjectures into a reality and America is now trying to adapt to the new situation by restructuring its military, its coalitions, and its support of friendly states in the Islamic world.

Another area of cooperation that has not been widely identified is the connection of counter-terrorism and the international drug trade. Al Qaeda raised funds through drug operations, and Solomon believes there is an opportunity to meld these two efforts.

The final area of cooperation involves weapons proliferation. The attacks and terrorist efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction underscored the danger of proliferation and highlighted the importance of cooperation. Given evidence that Osama bin Laden was pursuing nuclear and chemical weapons, Solomon notes that China may be more appreciative of America’s proliferation concerns.

America has had serious differences with the Chinese over proliferation issues but there is a "positive agenda" around which the U.S. and China can build a constructive working relationship. This agenda can help offset some of the contentious issues in the relationship with China that the administration must continue to manage.

Solomon concluded by highlighting the importance of China’s impending leadership succession on the future of the bilateral relationship. Jiang Zemin’s ability to retain power by remaining head of the Central Military Commission or by creating a new National Security Council will affect bilateral ties. The future of the relationship will also depend on China’s new leaders. Hu Jintao, widely viewed as Jiang’s likely successor, has never been to the U.S., and questions remain concerning his views of America. These new leaders will help define the character of U.S.-China relations in the years to come.

This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center staff member Kelani C. Chan.