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Program Brief, vol. 7, #12
© The Nixon Center 2001

"The Impact of Recent Developments on Future U.S.-China Relations"
A Discussion with Dr. Harry Harding, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University

The Nixon Center, Washington, DC
May 23, 2001

"Confused" was how Dr. Harry Harding, Dean of the George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs, described his understanding of current U.S policy toward China at a recent Nixon Center seminar on the U.S.-China relationship. Harding, a leading expert on China, also argued that top Chinese leaders are unsure of the direction of U.S. policy under President George W. Bush. Dr. David M. Lampton, Director of The Nixon Center China Program, moderated the discussion and provided his own assessment.

A series of events in the last few months have contributed to a deterioration of U.S.-China relations, including the 11-day detention of a U.S. air crew on the island of Hainan, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. visit of the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists, and issuing Taiwan’s leader a transit visa. While the "tactics" of the Bush Administration seem relatively clear, according to Harding, its "strategy" is not so clear—hence placing China in a difficult situation of interpreting U.S. motives. In comparison with the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration has lowered China’s priority and placed U.S. allies at the center of its Asia policy. China, along with other non-allies, will be relegated to the "second concentric circle," Harding said, in its relations with the United States. Thus the new administration, according to Harding, will be less accommodating toward China and is even taking proactive initiatives to re-order the U.S.-China relationship.

Still, Harding said, the Bush Administration is, however, not completely insensitive to Beijing’s concerns. For instance, the Administration sent James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, to Beijing to explore Chinese concerns about the NMD program. President Bush also met with China’s Vice Premier Qian Qichen during his visit to the United States and plans to visit Beijing in the fall of this year.

But the strategy behind the Administration’s "downgrading" of China remains unclear, said Harding. During the presidential campaign, George W. Bush described China as a strategic competitor—a vast change from former President Clinton’s identification of Beijing as a strategic partner. Once Bush entered office, however, his campaign rhetoric was downplayed, resulting in an ambiguous stance toward China. Harding sees this in part as evidence of deep divisions over U.S policy towards China. Describing his analysis of the Administration’s internal debate as "highly speculative," he suggested that currently there are three different visions of China policy within the Administration. The first is that the U.S. policy toward China should be akin to the Reagan Administration’s policy toward the USSR in the 1980s, the aim being to "bring down the communist system in China by engaging in a strategic and geo-economic competition with the country that the country cannot win." While this view is the most dangerous, according to Harding, it has the least support in the administration. A less dangerous alternative would be to view China as a strategic competitor, Harding said. This second vision involves identifying China as a communist system that is "intent upon redressing the balance in Asia to the detriment of the United States," a view that suggests the only appropriate response would be to counterbalance China. The third possible vision, "renegotiating cooperation," acknowledges the benefits of a cooperative relationship with China and aims to restructure U.S.-China relations in a way that would be more favorable to the United States.

The Chinese reaction to the recent changes in policy, Harding believes, has been "surprise and confusion"— surprise at the tactics of the new Administration and confusion over the strategic intentions behind those tactics. In response, Beijing has adopted an attitude of "wait and see," according to Harding. Strategically, China is being cautious, in hopes that the U.S. will eventually settle on a policy broadly similar to that of all previous U.S. administrations since President Nixon. Harding argued that China’s leaders are reluctant to aggravate relations with Washington because they have invested a great deal of political capital into the current policies toward the United States and they do not want to see these policies fail.

Though Harding sees both governments as interested in maintaining a cooperative relationship, he said that each side perceives the other as having an unfair advantage in the relationship. As a result, "the overarching framework integrating China into cooperative relations with the U.S. and the international community…is strained to the breaking point; there is no clear alternative that has been accepted on either side, but it will be very difficult to knit those tears in the framework back together in ways that will satisfy important constituencies on both sides," Harding stated.

David M. Lampton identified dangers as well as opportunities that China will encounter as it becomes more integrated into the international system.  Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) summit are great opportunities for China to establish itself in the international community. Beijing’s increased economic ties with Taiwan are also a positive development for China, according to Lampton. There is, however, the possibility that this period of tension between China and the United States will last for some time, which, Lampton noted, could pose problems for Chinese leaders who possess a limited capacity to absorb and contend with ever-changing policies and strategies. Hence, Lampton warns, the United States may be in danger of overburdening the bureaucratic system in Beijing. A weak China is a larger threat to America than a relatively stable China, he argued.

The possibility of US-China relations returning to normal was the main question on the minds of the audience. Harding put forward three possibilities for the future of US-China relations: (1) The relationship could begin to unravel, with every action prompting an escalated reaction; (2) The United States could reconstruct cooperation with China; (3) The relationship could continue in its current state of confusion until another major event such as the proposed summit in the fall sets the trajectory of the relationship. While Harding did not venture to say which outcome was most probable, he pointed out that uncertainty in policy is not always negative if it leaves open the possibility of genuine dialogue and improved relations. Whether this is the case in the U.S.-China relationship remains to be seen.

This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center staff member Catherine L. Corliss.